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Post by KoNeko on Jul 31, 2002 10:46:32 GMT -5
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Post by KoNeko on Jul 31, 2002 10:54:27 GMT -5
This one was written a few days ago- inspired by an idea I had for TDSC. I was going to write my "Train" story with Harry as the protagonist, when he was looking back on his time at Hogwarts- specifically how Ron died in their final year. Yes, I killed off Ron. Madam Pomfrey can't cure a broken neck you know. Especially if the patient has died from it already.
==== Medusa (26th July, 2002)
Never! He had said He did not know it Running in his red-hot rage He had not seen the stairs had moved.
Before a cry, a shout to stop, Another cry, a cry for help Before he fell.
Tumbling through endless space and cold. Blurring colours and life and death. The wind screaming for his voice to stop. To stop screaming.
The rivers of blood running like serpents from his head. On the stone floor.
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Post by KoNeko on Sept 20, 2002 0:59:16 GMT -5
This is an essay I wrote for my metaphysics class at university. It's about how the persistence of the self over time can be reconciled with the existence of deja vu.
The Self and Deja Vu[/u] (september 16, 2002)
Introduction: The nature of déjà vu The concept of déjà vu is not a recent one. Although it has been given more interest in recent times, the study of déjà vu has been around since the time of Freud, if not earlier . French for "already seen", déjà vu occurs where one has a "strong sense of global familiarity that occurs in a seemingly novel situation" . The event is "global" in the sense that all details of the event are part of the déjà vu experience. Déjà vu only appears to come into affect on the preempted event actually occurring- otherwise, it seems to be treated somewhat similarly to a vague or repressed memory.
Funkhouser suggests that there are actually three forms of déjà vu: déjà vecu (already experienced), déjà senti (already felt) and déjà visite (already visited) . Déjà vecu describes the feeling of having already been in a particular situation (and knowing what will happen next, in some cases). For the purposes of this essay, the references to déjà vu will specifically mean déjà vecu, as this is the most common form of déjà vu.
There is no explanation for déjà vu, although there are many theories about it. Freud proposes that déjà vu occurs as a result being spontaneously reminded of a repressed fantasy . In this way, we are not aware that we have these fantasies or thoughts, but their familiarity somehow permeates our conscious mind and therefore we experience the vague sense of having previously been in the situation. A slightly more novel explanation from parapsychology is that déjà vu presents us with an opportunity to visit our past lives. Although this may sound a bit strange, given that such concepts as tachyons, four-dimensionalist time and parallel universes are plausible, it has been argued that déjà vu is merely a "non-traditional way of seeing causality and for the possibility of neurological "time travel"" .
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Post by KoNeko on Sept 20, 2002 1:08:24 GMT -5
Déjà vu and Locke John Locke argues that it is one's self-awareness of past events that makes oneself the same person over time . That is, it is through one's memory that one's consciousness can reach backwards to past events in the history of oneself. If this is the case, then my existence only extends as far back as my consciousness (or memory) does. One notable objection that immediately arises from this is Butler's objection: that if I don't remember something, then it was not "me" that did it. If I lost my memory, I lost my identity. For example, if I were to suffer from amnesia and forget everything that occurred to me in the last three days, then, according to Locke, it would not have been me that was writing and researching this essay, or cooking pasta for dinner, or any of the other things I have done in the last three days. There is something unsatisfactory about this. Locke does not really seem to address this, as he is interested in the self for the purposes of judgement and resurrection- that is, how one would be judged at the end of time.
Déjà vu presents a problem for Locke's argument in this way- if déjà vu is a manifestation of a memory in the sense that I feel that "I have been here before", then is it possible that it was "me" that was here the first time around? If I experienced event E at time T1, and at time T2, after experiencing E again, I recall having experienced E at T1 (or at least, I recall having experienced E previously), regardless of whether I was actually correct about this memory, surely for the purposes of my memory, I did experience E at both T1 and T2. However, it must be noted here that events as described above would arguably only apply in cases where the surroundings or fact scenario were somewhat familiar. It is possible that the fact that I may have done something a lot over time can lead to my memory creating a "close enough" effect . For example, I wash the dishes every night after dinner at home, and I am almost certain to be standing behind the sink when the news comes on. Now, suppose (heaven forbid) that there was a war going on in a faraway country, but progress had been very slow. The newsreader gives a news report on this war so similar to one that I had heard three nights ago that in my processing of the information I am receiving from the newsreader, my mind confuses the two situations for being the same and I mistakenly experience déjà vu. This example shows where I have a memory of a particular event that has happened in the past, and it was me that did it at the time, even if I was mistaken about the specific details of the experience.
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Post by KoNeko on Sept 20, 2002 1:11:06 GMT -5
Compare the above example with one where I am in a foreign country, and I know that I have never been to this place before (and I can verify this by the stamps in my passport, etc.) the fact that I can recall having been to this place would mean very little, because I know (objectively and subjectively) that it was not me who was here the first time. This presumably would not be a problem for Locke, as it is evident that I have been mistaken, and therefore it was not me who was in this country at T1. However, this raises another question- if I wasn't in a foreign country at T1 (as my memory suggests), then where was I, and more importantly, who was I at that point? Obviously, if I believed I was experiencing E at T1, when I wasn't actually, and there is no other suggestion as to what I was doing, then I have forgotten what really happened at T1. Should this be the case, then for all it matters, I didn't exist at T1. However, this does not seem to be a very satisfactory answer- I do not like the idea that I can drop in and out of existence depending on what I can remember.
The "patchy" person Obviously, we cannot remember things that are outside our memories. Moreover, it is very unlikely (if not impossible) to be able to remember every single event that has occurred to oneself to the smallest detail. Therefore it seems that we must make reasonable allowances for "holes" in the continuity of one's existence over time. It seems that as long as I have sufficient causal connections between myself at T1, T2, T3 and so on, then I am arguably the same person over time. For example, right now I may not remember everything from the time that I was 5 years old, but I can remember what I was like at the age of 12. If the 12-year-old me can recall what I was like at the age of 5, then I have established sufficient continuity to explain the persistence of my self from the age of 5 onwards. In this way, severe amnesia (or even dementia) is problematic for Locke, as it destroys the continuity of memory required to explain continuity of the self. So, in support of Locke's argument, people can be "gappy" and can have some memories missing, but they cannot be too "gappy".
For example, if my desk is missing a single drawer, it still is a desk. Even if it is missing all of its drawers, it is arguably still a desk. However, if it were missing all of its drawers, half of the desktop and three legs, I would be very reluctant to call the pile of wood in front of me a "desk". What, then, is the distinction between my desk with all its components intact, and the pile of wood? It seems to be a question of degree. Similarly, in people, having a few memories missing here and there still makes oneself the same person over time, but having so many memories missing that one cannot conceivably establish the continuance of oneself over time by memory does not. At this point, it is important to note a possible reply to the desk analogy- in the example above, the desk only appears to cease being a desk once it does not fulfill its function. While drawers are an important and helpful asset to the desk fulfilling its function, they are not necessary, unlike when the legs of the desk have gone missing and all one is left with is a big, flat piece of wood. Analogously, however, this does not apply to people. If Locke argues that memory is what defines the persistence of the self over time, they are, unlike the desk drawers, a vital part of the self, and without sufficient memory, the self cannot exist at all.
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Post by KoNeko on Sept 20, 2002 1:12:11 GMT -5
What is the role of déjà vu in all of this? It appears that déjà vu may be used to "fill in" some of the gaps in one's consciousness. Where one's memories of an event are rather patchy, déjà vu can be used to supply oneself with a (somewhat similar) version of the events. For example, if my doing of event E at time T2 gives me a vague sense of familiarity when I cannot remember what was happening at time T1 but event E is somewhat reminiscent of that time, I could probably infer that I was doing event E (or something like it) at T1. Although it is not exactly the same as the original experience, it is similar enough to do the trick- not unlike a drawer I have taken from another desk which is of a similar fit to my own, to substitute for the hole in the side of my desk.
Delusions[u/] Suppose that I drink so much that I am completely blind drunk and I cannot remember a thing. When I wake up the next day, I have a hideous tattoo on my arm. I have no idea how it got there, but, for some reason I choose not to question it and over time, I get used to the idea of having it there. In fact, I grow to like it so much that I decide to get another one done. I go to (unbeknownst to me at the time) the same tattoo store that I visited on my drunken binge. Once I am in the store, I get the vague sense of familiarity that I have been here before, although I don't know when/how. In fact, I even know where the waiting rooms etc., are. There is no doubt that I was the same person as I was prior to by drunken binge. Did I experience déjà vu? In a way I did not, because I had actually been to that place before, and I was just mistaken as to the novelty of the place. However, in another sense, I am experiencing the tattoo store for the first time in my conscious state. Following Locke, it is consciousness that makes identity, so I am in the store for the first time. If this were the case, the weird feeling I got on entering the store would most likely be dismissed as déjà vu, despite the evidence to the contrary (i.e. the tattoo I already have). This does not seem to be a very satisfactory answer either.
What if déjà vu was treated as a form of delusion? Delusions occur when one's perception of the facts are inconsistent with what actually happened. Is a delusional person a different person from who they are when they are "normal"? Arguably, they could be, depending on whether their memories were sufficiently intact or not. Delusions seem to support Locke's argument. For example, I can still remember what happened to me yesterday, but now I also believe that John Howard is an alien. Even if I cannot explain or remember how I came to the conclusion that John Howard is an alien, I am still reasonably the same person that I was yesterday. My identity has not been affected by the fact that I am now slightly delusional.
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Post by KoNeko on Sept 20, 2002 1:13:02 GMT -5
The memory illusion and Q-memories From a scientific point of view, ordinary memories of experiences we have had can become distorted and confused over time . Just as we can be deceived by optical illusions (e.g. a stick submerged in water may appear to look bent- and on pulling it out of the water, it is actually straight), surely we can also be deceived by illusions of memory. Perhaps we can be deceived by memory even more so than optical illusions because we cannot really verify things that have happened in the past. If I were to ask person A about what I did yesterday, I would be relying on their memory, which might be just as deceived as mine is.
Locke believes that when we are born, we are "brain-clean" , i.e., we merely have the capacity to take in information about the world. (Presumably we would also have a priori knowledge, but Locke is interested in the type of information that we acquire empirically about the outside world.) This is consistent with his notion of identity and memory, as I would acquire my identity (and also memories) through experiences I have when I come in contact with the world. If I were to be brainwashed, my memories would change, and therefore how I approached and dealt with the world would be affected. Because all these aspects of my identity were altered, I would effectively be a "different" person. (This is not unlike the Phineas Gage example , only here I would not retain my former memories.)
Difficulties may arise where there are so many different (and false) memories streaming through my consciousness such that I could not coherently form a causal chain of memories to a few hours ago (e.g. If I was constantly being "re-programmed"). Another example of this is "Quasi-memories", or memories I have formed subsequent to the event I am remembering. I do not remember anything about my 3rd birthday. If, today, I was told by my mother what I did on that day in sufficient detail, and I saw video/photographic evidence of that, I might form a "memory" as to what happened that day, even though I myself do not remember anything from the time. However, if my father also tells me I did something different (and inconsistent with my mother's version of events) on that day, I may also form a "memory" as to what happened on that day. Does that mean that, according to Locke, I was a both places and being two people? This sounds rather absurd. Something that may support the objection to Locke would be the existence video cameras or other things that offer a somewhat objective interpretation of the event. If I had memories of doing two different things at one time, I could deduce from the video what I was really doing.
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Post by KoNeko on Sept 20, 2002 1:14:27 GMT -5
PrecallIf memories are what extends my identity backwards in time, perhaps déjà vu can be explained as extending me forwards in time, as glimpses as to who I am in the future. This is the concept of "precall" (as opposed to recall), i.e. remembering something that has not happened yet, or is only happening now. Locke does not discuss the plausibility of time travel, nor anything to do with time, but it is arguable that since it is consciousness that presupposes identity, if I can be conscious and aware of myself at a future date, then I will exist then. It is possible that his theory can be extrapolated in this way. Several problems arise with this interpretation of déjà vu, as would with any discussions about the concept of time. If I experience E at time T1, am I fated to experience E at T2? It is less than likely, given the vague nature of déjà vu. Moreover, for many of us, at the time we first experience E, we are not aware that this would give rise to a déjà vu event, and would dismiss it. ConclusionThere is no doubt as to the existence of déjà vu. It appears that déjà vu and the persistence of the self can be reconciled in a limited sense. The very fact that déjà vu is vague and is easily passed out of consciousness presents a problem for those who are attempting to argue that déjà vu is a manifestation of one's memory. Locke's theory of identity from memory, although it may not necessarily be hindered by the problem of déjà vu, falls down in several other cases such as amnesia and false memories. However, in the area of déjà vu, it seems that a proper objection to Locke may be structured once the nature of déjà vu can be properly explained. Even so, it is still currently an area ripe for explanation and continued research. Bibliography Blakemore, C., The Mechanics of the Mind Farman, J., A Phenomenally Phrank (sic) History of Philosophy (without the poncy bits), Macmillan, 1996 Locke, J., Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter XXVII Roediger, H. L. III, "Memory Illusions" in the Journal of memory and language, vol 35, 76-100 (1996) Article No. 005 Johnson, J., UGH! I just got the creepiest feeling that I have been here before: Déjà vu and the brain, consciousness and self, serendip.brynmawr.edu/bb/neuro/neuro98/202s98-paper2/Johnson2.html, accessed September 13th, 2002 Lampinen, J.M., "What exactly is déjà vu?" at Scientific American.com, posted May 13th, 2002 at www.sciam.com/askexpert_question.cfm?articleID=000F0615-85C1-1CD9-B4A8809EC588EEDF&catID=3&topicID=3, accessed September 13th, 2002
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Post by KoNeko on Sept 20, 2002 7:41:01 GMT -5
Why people are like doughnuts
Doughnuts are essentially made of what is around the hole. So, if we are the hole, we are made up of what is around us. The people and places and things we interact with are what gives us our shape and personality. So without them, we are essentially not very much at all.
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Post by KoNeko on Sept 23, 2002 9:19:33 GMT -5
This is a poem I wrote back in July about a few of the people on this board, and who are my fellow Glenmorians. *sighs* It's incomplete, because I lost inspiration to finish writing it, so the first half is here, and then the bits with question marks indicate bits I haven't written, and at the rate I'm going, I probably won't. But yeah, hopefully the plot is still understandable in some sense... The Maid of Aurellion A ballad about the events at the Spring equinox festival of the trees
'Twas in the deepest of the night When in the woods of Glenmore fair Where fairies lit the guided paths And wizards hurried on their staffs To reach the clearing there
Behind the caves of stony rock Beneath the stars, below the moon Inside the ring of flattened grass (Where dance and drink soon came to pass) The sun would not rise soon
The centaur struck a merry tune The elf, the tiger, witches three The fox-boy with his tails so long All danced together to the song The strangest sight to see
The trees had ambled in to watch The dancing and the antics there When from the darkness of the night A maiden in a gown of white With cropped and flaxen hair
A crown of lilies on her head Her skin was green and pale as death Her clan of creatures gathered round And frolicked in the watery sound Of laughter on her breath
===
They danced, unknowing in the night Away; Outside the hallowed ring From shadows yonder Glenmore's glen From hollow, bog and swamped fen There stirred an evil thing
==
The trees and creatures screamed as one As destruction reigned, and The troll left nothing in its wake As trees did fall and the ground did shake
(Missing a whole lot here, but you can imagine what transpired)
So from the clearing in the wood Beyond the caves of Glenmore fair Despite the sadness of this song The maiden from Aurellion Still hoping, lingers there.
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Post by coldmercurywitch on Sept 25, 2002 12:08:34 GMT -5
KoNeko...it's beautiful. It really truly is. Like I said before, I envy you, cos i can't write rhyming poetry. Ilove the way the rhyme is off beat, cos to me, it kind of hints that something is wrong: that trouble is brewing.
It's a shame you didn't know what to do wiht the rest of it. Maybe one day you'll finish it. I hoep so anyway.
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Post by KoNeko on Oct 28, 2002 6:48:56 GMT -5
Thanks Ele. I actually wrote it in the style of one of my favourite poems, Kubla Khan by S.T. Coleridge. It's slightly off beat and paints this fantastic picture of a fantasy sort of world. Actually, I'll post it here.
Kubla Khan Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 1798
In Xanadu did Kubla Khan A stately pleasure-dome decree: Where Alph, the sacred river, ran Through caverns measureless to man Down to a sunless sea. So twice five miles of fertile ground With walls and towers were girdled round: And here were gardens bright with sinuous rills Where blossomed many an incense-bearing tree; And here were forests ancient as the hills, Enfolding sunny spots of greenery. But oh! that deep romantic chasm which slanted Down the green hill athwart a cedarn cover! A savage place! as holy and enchanted As e'er beneath a waning moon was haunted By woman wailing for her demon-lover!
And from this chasm, with ceaseless turmoil seething, As if this earth in fast thick pants were breathing, A mighty fountain momently was forced; Amid whose swift half-intermitted burst Huge fragments vaulted like rebounding hail, Or chaffy grain beneath the thresher's flail: And 'mid these dancing rocks at once and ever It flung up momently the sacred river. Five miles meandering with a mazy motion Through wood and dale the sacred river ran, Then reached the caverns measureless to man, And sank in tumult to a lifeless ocean: And 'mid this tumult Kubla heard from far Ancestral voices prophesying war!
The shadow of the dome of pleasure Floated midway on the waves: Where was heard the mingled measure From the fountain and the caves. It was a miracle of rare device, A sunny pleasure-dome with caves of ice! A damsel with a dulcimer In a vision once I saw: It was an Abyssinian maid, And on her dulcimer she played, Singing of Mount Abora. Could I revive within me Her symphony and song, To such a deep delight 't would win me That with music loud and long, I would build that dome in air, That sunny dome! those caves of ice! And all who heard should see them there, And all should cry, Beware! Beware! His flashing eyes, his floating hair! Weave a circle round him thrice, And close your eyes with holy dread, For he on honey-dew hath fed, And drunk the milk of Paradise.
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Post by KoNeko on Oct 28, 2002 6:57:32 GMT -5
And now for the infamous euthanasia essay.
The stupid footnotes aren't working, so when I state a fact or a case, just imagine that there's a footnote citing it or explaining something. Switching off: the legal and ethical consequences of terminating treatment in long-term unconscious or vegetative patientsIn 1993, in the landmark case of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland[/i], the House of Lords declared that it was permissible for doctors treating a patient in a persistent vegetative state to cease treatment without incurrinnbg any civil or criminal liability . The reasoning behind the decision was that continuing life support was not in the best interests of the patient as there was little to no prospect of the patient recovering . This justifies passive euthanasia in the event of incompetent patients who have not previously expressed their wishes. In Australia, the position is less clear, although it is commonly accepted that a patient's life support can be switched off in particular circumstances. The field of medicine has always championed the sanctity of life since the time of Hippocrates: "I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel" . However, Bland suggests that even if active euthanasia (involving the administration of life-arresting treatment ) is explicitly proscribed by medical ethics, passive euthanasia- or the withdrawal of life-saving treatment - still appears to be acceptable.
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Post by KoNeko on Oct 28, 2002 7:03:39 GMT -5
The Bland decision has several ramifications on end-of-life issues which this essay seeks to discuss. Firstly, despite their achieving the same ends, is there a moral distinction between active and passive euthanasia? Next, when is it appropriate to withdraw life-saving treatment? Who should have the power to make that decision, and on what criteria? This will be discussed with regard to the decision in Bland. Finally, the role of the courts in this particular aspect of law will be considered.
Definitions It is important to establish some basic terms that will be used in this essay. Euthanasia comes from the Greek term meaning "the happy death", but the actual definition becomes obscure in English . Bagaric prefers the definition used by Glover: "killing someone, on account of his [or her] distressing physical or mental state, where this is thought to be in his [or her] own interests" . This is quite fitting particularly to non-voluntary euthanasia, where the patient is not in a position to consent or refuse the treatment (e.g. because they are comatose, or are otherwise incompetent.) However, in regards to passive euthanasia the use of the term "killing" seems questionable, as the primary cause of death in such patients is the omission of the necessary medical treatment (such as nutrition or oxygen). Perhaps a better term to use here instead of "killing" would be "letting die", as "killing" suggests a positive act occurring at that particular point in time, as opposed to the cessation of life-saving treatment and the subsequent death over the ensuing weeks.
Acts and Omissions There is a clear legal distinction in Australia between active and passive euthanasia. Active euthanasia involves a positive action with the intention to kill, and is covered by case law and legislation . Passive euthanasia, on the other hand, is allowed under current law. It is not illegal to administer a substance to a patient for the purposes of alleviating pain and suffering, even if it is incidental that the substance may accelerate death. Markowicz states that "an individual's attitude and intention are of utmost importance. The intention that guides the act which results in death is what determines whether the act itself was a commission or omission…" , thereby determining the legality of the act. There is a distinction between intention and foresight- that is, seeing a consequence will flow from an event is not the same from intending that consequence. Even so, in the case of omitting to act (i.e. passive euthanasia), it is arguable that where one foresees that a death will occur resulting from a particular course of action, one is still responsible for that consequence. Williams calls this the doctrine of negative responsibility , but it would only apply where there was a direct effect on the issue at hand.
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Post by KoNeko on Oct 28, 2002 7:11:23 GMT -5
However, it is quite common that life-sustaining treatment be ceased once the particular factors (such as the patient's best interests, the interests of the family, the quality of the patient's life, etc.) have been weighed up without any legal recourse. The intention to end the life of a patient is present in both cases. It is permissible for medical practitioners to terminate a patient's life support with the proper consent of the patient's family. The basis for this legal reasoning turns upon the acts and omissions doctrine, which claims that it "prevents our lives being intolerably burdened by demarcating the extent to which we must help others" . This may seem acceptable prima facie, but there are clearly instances where this very foundation is questionable. Although the doctrine states that we have no obligation to help others, even where we fail to prevent death or serious damage, surely there are situations in which we may be morally compelled to act. For example, it seems "wrong" for a world-class lifesaver to pass by a child drowning in a swimming pool, when rescuing the child would have little or no burden on himself. Another example would be where one watches a murder take place without calling for help . Bagaric refers to this as the "maxim of positive duty", and submits that it buttresses the doctrine of acts and omissions . This appears to give us a fuller view of our ethical responsibility to others, and is preferable over using the acts and omissions doctrine alone. This is also reflected in the law, as one may be just as liable for omissions as acts under the Crimes Act . Therefore, there does not seem to be much of a difference between active and passive euthanasia at a moral level, despite the distinction at law.
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