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Post by KoNeko on Nov 21, 2003 8:48:07 GMT -5
Current inadequacies with the Family Court system for migrants[/u] There appear to be two main areas in which migrants find difficulty in accessing the court system. These are: • Language barriers • Cultural misunderstandings
It is also important that, in addition to this, migrant clients often also experience other problems that they wouldn’t encounter if in they remained in their country of origin. These include feelings of dislocation, loss of family/support networks, difficulty with economic survival and the threat of racism. Finally, it may seem obvious but the fact that a person is seeking legal help (particularly in relation to family law) usually indicates that they are going through an emotionally painful and invariably stressful time. When all these points are considered together it is apparent that migrants would be in a very vulnerable position.
Language barriers With 13 percent of Australian residents having been born in non-English speaking countries , the language problem for migrant clients is apparent from the moment that they enter a court building. The lack of signage would make it difficult for them to figure out what to do once they got there. This seems odd as many courts are established in or around areas where there are high migrant populations. Moreover, the presence of security guards and metal detectors, albeit necessary, may prove daunting for those unfamiliar with the system, especially for those who have come to Australia to escape particularly repressive regimes or who otherwise have a fear of the law. If they did make their way to the information desk, they would be greeted by a staff member who probably didn’t speak their language or have access to multilingual material. Interpreters are also usually unavailable on site to explain instructions or documents. All in all, it would be a very frustrating and confusing experience. [/color]
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Post by KoNeko on Nov 21, 2003 8:48:57 GMT -5
The Family Court also prides itself on having a high success rate for resolution through mediation or conciliation. In fact, only about 6 percent of cases are heard before a judge- the remaining 94 percent are resolved through mediation, consent orders or other assistance of lawyers . However, mediation is that much more difficult when English is not a first language and the view of marriage and marital breakdown, particularly the concept of ¡§no-fault divorce¡¨, may be foreign to migrants. Moreover, mediation may not be as effective where individuals are reluctant to use the Family Court because of concerns about the process or their privacy, or embarrassment about the situation. This may be particularly relevant for migrants who come from backgrounds where divorce is frowned upon or where it was not culturally acceptable to publicly discuss one¡¦s family life.
The relevance of language is also apparent in ensuring that clients understand court orders so that they can comply with them and know the consequences of breaching these orders. On a more basic level, it is also necessary that people can be heard effectively and that the Court can understand what they want. It is therefore apparent that certain steps must be taken to accommodate for migrants and other people who may not speak English so that they can effectively gain access to the legal system.
Cultural misunderstandings It has been shown that family structures will vary between cultures. For example, ¡§Australians who come from Asia, Southern Europe, and the Middle East place more weight on all forms of responsibility and obligation than those who came from Western Europe and from Anglo backgrounds¡¨ . Many immigrant families may be ¡§less accepting of cohabitation before marriage, have a greater responsibility for ageing parents, have greater respect for education and value harmony within the family" . While this is not to say that all immigrant families have this view, or that all non-immigrant families do not share these views, but there is a general conception among migrant families to have a greater emphasis on family. This may be because new immigrants, unfamiliar with language and culture, may have nobody but their families for support on first arriving.
As a result, there may be a greater ethic of ¡§looking after one¡¦s own¡¨ in these cultures, which in turn would give rise to a reluctance to separate family members even in the face of a family breakdown. Many non-Anglo Saxon legal systems also emphasise the importance of collective values, with marriage being an alliance of families, and a divorce would represent a severing of that alliance which may fuel the existing conflict . In fact, the sad reality is that Australia has a higher divorce rate than that of many of the countries from which the migrant families come , which makes it more likely for families in these situations to come to blows.
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Post by KoNeko on Nov 21, 2003 8:49:54 GMT -5
Proposed solutions It is important that certain steps be taken in order to assist migrants and non-English speakers effectively. There are several simple solutions that can be adopted to make the court experience less daunting for migrants.
Overcoming the language barrier As this is the predominant stumbling block for many migrant clients, it is essential that it be addressed properly. The issue here seems to be a need to inform migrants of what the court does and how individuals should go about seeking legal help. This can be done in several ways.
1. Printed materials- the Family Court currently provides booklets in several languages to assist migrants through the judicial process. These explain what the process does and, more importantly, how the individual¡¦s legal rights are affected. This makes justice more accessible for migrants, particularly for litigants (many of which would be self-represented).
The information in the Family Court Books could be put into audio form. This was a recommendation by Justice Mushin on behalf of the Family Court¡¦s Ethnic Advisory Committee to assist non-English speakers who are not literate in their own language. Alternatively, information could be delivered in the form of videotapes or TV programs on community-based stations such as Channel 31.
In relation to court documents, it would be impractical to have forms in other languages, as specific legal terms may be difficult to understand or have translated. In such cases, it would be appropriate to have on-site interpreters to read and explain the documents to the client and to help them fill out their forms correctly.
2. Use of interpreters- sometimes non-English speaking clients rely on their friends or family members to translate court documents and instruct solicitors. While this seems to be a practical alternative to hiring an interpreter, there may be technical legal terms which inexperienced interpreters may have difficulty translating. This is a risk in doing this as the legal consequences in an error would be very serious. There is already an existing telephone interpreter service which may be of help in instances where the conversation may be brief, but it is not helpful to use this when translating documents or dealing with complex legal situations.
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Post by KoNeko on Nov 21, 2003 8:50:59 GMT -5
Alternatively, in August 1994 the Sydney registry introduced a special Interpreter Assisted Divorce List to help Cantonese and Mandarin speaking applicants . It was introduced after, due to a lack of understanding of the process (and sometimes very similar names), the wrong parties would present at the bar table, thereby prolonging and frustrating the previous system. The Interpreter Divorce List allows Chinese applicants to elect to be dealt with on a particular day (once every three weeks) where interpreters were available, which has proven to be popular with Sydney¡¦s Chinese community. The idea could be adapted to suit Victorian courts, with interpreter services available depending on the frequency of demand and the language required. 3. Signage- where courts are situated in areas with high migrant populations, it may be appropriate to place signs directing clients to the appropriate area. If the approval of the appropriate local council is also sought, it may also be useful to have signs in community languages around the court as well so clients know where to go.
iCultural awareness There are cultural differences which should be taken into account by courts should it be relevant in a client¡¦s application. In these cases, it would be up to the client to draw attention to certain cultural practices, but perhaps staff at the courts should be aware of the needs to the needs of certain cultures, particularly in residence and contact cases and how the practice of a culture might affect the best interests of the child .
The law does not give preference to one culture over another and as such cultural practices as matters to be considered under the paramountcy principle. However, it is important for judges to still distinguish between practices which are commonly accepted (such as vegetarianism) and those that are not (such as female genital mutilation). There is a very fine balancing act in deciding whether a cultural practice is acceptable; on one hand, the practice might seem obscure or unconventional, but on the other hand, in not allowing the child to engage in these practices, they might be deprived of a part of their traditional culture.
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Post by KoNeko on Nov 21, 2003 8:51:37 GMT -5
Should these situations arise, it may be easier for judges and court staff to come to a determination if they were sensitive to the cultural framework. It would also benefit the migrant client if courts were seen to be coming to their decision in such a weighing up process, so as not to appear biased against the particular cultural practice in question.
Community assistance Courts should ensure that they have the confidence of the multicultural community, as this is commonly the first local institution that migrants would turn to in their new country. This can be achieved by providing community leaders/offices with copies of court booklets and liaising with them regularly to show ongoing cooperation and accountability. Letting clients know where they can go for translating or interpreting services would also be helpful and would make the courts work better with the community.
Conclusion Australia is the home to a myriad of different nations and cultures, giving us the richness and diversity that many people identify this country with. Sadly, people from all parts of the community will experience marital and family breakdowns, and it is often those that are not familiar with the language or cultural environment that would be the hardest hit. As a result, the process becomes painful and complicated for those involved.
The new implementations by the Family Court as described above would make the process less difficult for people of culturally diverse or non-English speaking backgrounds. Publishing information in different languages, as well as in audio form, and providing appropriate community support therefore make the system more approachable and sensitive to the needs of culturally diverse people.
By introducing these new changes, the judicial system would be fairer to those who would otherwise be disadvantaged by language or cultural misunderstandings. It would make the system more accessible and therefore be well on the way to reflecting the needs of a truly diverse society.
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Post by KoNeko on Nov 21, 2003 8:54:02 GMT -5
BIBLIOGRAPHY[/i] Legislation[/u] Family Law Act (Cth) 1995 The Australian Constitution (Cth) Reports/Articles[/u] Australian Law Reform Commission, 57 ¡§Multiculturalism and the Law¡¨, 1992 Batrouney and Stone, ¡§Cultural Diversity and Family Exchanges¡¨, Australian Institute of Family Studies, 1998 de Vaus, D, ¡§Children¡¦s Responsibilities to elderly parents¡¨, Family Matters no 45 1996 Justice A. Nicholson, ¡§Cultural Diversity and the Family Court: Taking a responsive approach to the family law needs of a diversified Australia¡¨, www.familycourt.gov.au/papers/html/cultural_diversity_html, accessed 14 November 2003 Justice A. Nicholson, ¡§Ethnic Family Values and the Family Law Act¡¨, www.familycourt.gov.au/papers/html/nichoson5.html, accessed 14 November 2003 [/color]
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Post by KoNeko on Aug 10, 2004 2:47:20 GMT -5
This is an essay I wrote for my philosophy honours class- basically Davidson had an argument as to why animals are not capable of rational thought (because they don't have language), and I'm trying to debunk him. Again, I haven't put in the footnotes. Barking up the wrong tree: A re-evaluation and critique of Davidson¡¦s requirements for belief What is belief?In his paper ¡§Rational Animals¡¨, Davidson argues that animals are incapable of belief, because we encounter problems when we try to ascertain what exactly it is that animals believe. But what exactly is belief? The notion of what constitutes belief is, at best, rather ambiguous. Despite what Davidson says, we regularly use the term to ascribe particular states to humans and animals. For example, if we were to see a dog chasing a cat up a tree, and then the dog sitting at the bottom the tree, barking, we might be inclined to say that ¡§the dog believes that the cat is up the tree¡¨ . There is something about the dog¡¦s behaviour which makes it a natural hypothesis to attribute some sort of belief to it. Smith argues that the attribution of belief-like states to animals comes as a product of our ¡§common sense psychology¡¨ of what we construe as beliefs (or at least, intentional states) . As a result, he claims that denial of such states to animals who behave in ways analogous to ourselves is anthropocentric and somewhat counterintuitive, given the common use of the term ¡§belief¡¨. In this essay, ¡§belief¡¨ encompasses other intentional states (such as desire, fear, hope, etc.) as the attribution of any intentional state to a creature presupposes the attribution of belief to that creature. If we are to say that humans have beliefs but animals do not, we need something to establish what is required for beliefs. In this essay I will examine Davidson¡¦s requirements for belief and his argument against the attribution of those beliefs to animals. Davidson¡¦s argument has several parts to it which I will look at in turn, although I think that his argument as a whole sets such a high threshold for the attribution of beliefs that the result is a blanket denial of beliefs and intentions to animals. However, the reason for his doing so seems to be rather unclear, and potentially results in further problems with his argument and its counterintuitive results. Finally, after refuting Davidson¡¦s requirements, I will present a possible argument for how we can attribute beliefs to animals.
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Post by KoNeko on Aug 10, 2004 2:49:07 GMT -5
Davidson¡¦s requirement for belief Davidson argues that animals do not have beliefs because, in order to have beliefs, the animal must be able to interpret language, and must have the concept of belief (that is, beliefs about beliefs). It is not logically impossible that animals should have thoughts and beliefs, so why does Davidson argue against the attribution of beliefs to animals?
If we can break Davidson¡¦s argument down, it appears to have the following structure:
1. In order to attribute beliefs to a creature, that creature must necessarily have the concept of beliefs. 2. Having the concept of beliefs entails having the concept of having beliefs about beliefs and the ability to distinguish between subjective and objective truths 3. The distinction between subjective and objective truths can be ascertained through the interpretation of language. 4. Therefore, in order to attribute the concept of belief to a creature, that creature must be an interpreter of language. 5. Animals do not have language; therefore we cannot attribute beliefs to them.
Opponents to Davidson object to his argument on the basis of premises (2) and (3). It is one thing to talk about the attributions of beliefs to a creature, but that is quite different to jump from that to requiring the creature to be able to distinguish between subjective and objective truths through the interpretation of language. I think that it is rather anthropocentric to use a language as a requirement for belief. Perhaps there is another way to look at whether animals could have belief without language. This can be seen by reference to certain behaviour. There are basic concepts that animals have to understand for their survival . For example, food is for eating. If an animal considers something food, there must be a quality about the ¡§food¡¨ which causes the animal to eat it. Along these lines, we can roughly say that if we see an animal put something in its mouth, chew and swallow it, we would say that the animal has a reason for thinking that it is food and has an intention to carry out the action of eating it.
Intentional action and explanation Similarly, Bishop allows for the attribution of beliefs to animals on the basis of intention . If we can demonstrate that animals (creatures without language) can show reasoning, or there is some sort of practical explanation for their actions, we can use this as a preliminary step to dismantle Davidson¡¦s argument on the grounds that intention entails the ability for thought, which entails the ability for belief.
Likewise, Hume observed that there were some actions that animals did which were analogous to certain actions that humans do which we would consider to be intentional . While this appears to present an initial argument for whether animals could act intentionally, it should be noted that Hume thought that ¡§reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls ¡¨. So, for Hume, there was no distinction between actions brought about by premeditation and reason and actions brought about by instinctive responses to stimuli. However, we could develop Hume¡¦s argument further and first attribute perception to animals, because it is obvious that animals perceive.
Armstrong argues that there is a close connection between perceiving something and acquiring knowledge about it. If an animal can acquire knowledge, then that knowledge will give rise to beliefs . However, Armstrong also argues that there are two senses in which the concept of perception can be applied. One concept involves merely perceiving objects, events, etc., while the other requires perceiving that ¡§it is the case that X¡¨.
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Post by KoNeko on Aug 10, 2004 2:50:41 GMT -5
Armstrong argues that, if we say that the kind of perception required for beliefs are merely ¡§states that register information about the environment¡¨ , then animals do indeed have beliefs. But then, so do plants which flower depending on the amount of sun in the environment, Venus fly traps, and heat-seeking cruise missiles and thermometers. Even if we qualify his argument so that beliefs mean that a creature that perceives changes in their environment and modifies their behaviour accordingly, while animals would have beliefs on this account, it still seems no different from a basic stimulus and response model. What I think we are lacking is the notion of intentional action. A creature has to process the information, decide what to do with it and then choose a course of action appropriate in light of those intentions. However, given that animals can have complex stimulus and response networks, we need something further to qualify what we mean by an intentional action.
The possibility of error and the objective truth Davidson would argue that what we are missing is the concept of belief. If an animal is to be capable of belief, it must have the concept of belief , and gives two further criteria for what this means. Firstly, to have a concept of belief, the creature must have beliefs about beliefs (that is, second order beliefs) . This is because an interpreter of language would have beliefs about the beliefs that another language-user holds. Next, the creature must also have the concept of ¡§objective truth¡¨ as a source to refer any changes in their beliefs to . The requirement of an objective truth in conjunction with the notion of second order beliefs also provides us with the ability to identify mistakes, which in turn means that we have to identify truth and falsity of concepts that we have of the world. Therefore, reference to an objective truth seems to also require ideas about the world at large. Davidson does not discuss this, but I think that if we have ideas about the world, then those ideas would be necessarily connected. For example, experiments involving association between objects and stimuli (such as that of Pavlov¡¦s dog ) would be defeated if this were not the case.
In any event, let us grant that if we have the concept of a belief being true or false, then the truth or falsity of that belief must be referable to an objective truth about the world. Davidson draws on the example of the coin in his pocket to illustrate this. He says:
¡§Suppose I believe there is a coin in my pocket. I empty my pocket and find no coin. I am surprised. Clearly enough I could not have been surprised (though I could be startled) if I did not have beliefs in the first place¡K ¡¨
The relevant factor here is that the creature can recognise that he or she has made a mistake. Davidson argues that this shows the capacity to identify a previously held belief as false and to correct it accordingly. As such, identification of a mistaken belief in light of a different belief in the world requires the capacity for a ¡§subjective-objective¡¨ contrast .
The subjective-objective contrast can only be seen in cases where the potential for error has also been acknowledged. So, if I can amend my own, subjective perception of the world such that it fits in with the objective condition that the world is in, and in doing so I acknowledge that my initial perception of the world was mistaken, then (according to Davidson) I am capable of the concept of belief. Davidson calls this notion ¡§surprise¡¨, and contrasts it with ¡§startlement¡¨, which is the state that a creature is in when it holds a false belief and may correct it but without realising that their previous belief was false.
However, Smith believes that the concept of surprise can be interpreted on two views. The first, weaker, view is one where the creature is merely disposed to change its beliefs as it obtains more evidence about the world, but does not have to identify the possibility of being mistaken. This sounds like a definition of startlement to me, but at any rate, Davidson would subscribe to the stronger view that the additional hurdle of the creature actively discriminating between the concept of truth and falsity is required. If this were the case, Smith believes that the average two-year-old child would be a counterexample to Davidson¡¦s argument , although Davidson would probably agree with Smith and deny that a two-year-old child had beliefs, on the premise that they have not developed the requisite capacity for beliefs about the truth and falsity of their beliefs yet . As such, Smith has not provided an adequate counterexample to refute Davidson¡¦s argument.
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Post by KoNeko on Aug 10, 2004 2:52:00 GMT -5
However, it may be possible to refute Davidson¡¦s notion of surprise by another means. Is being surprised a necessary condition of belief? Davidson argues that surprise about ¡§some things¡¨ is necessary and sufficient to thought in general , so having the capacity to distinguish between true and false beliefs becomes necessary. There seems to be something dissatisfying about Davidson¡¦s reliance on the notion of surprise, which raises a rather odd question: what if an occasion for surprise never arises? I can conceive of a creature that holds only true beliefs . If I can think of it, then it is logically possible that such a creature exists. If such a creature exists, would it not be a problem for Davidson? Having only true beliefs means that the creature is not open to the possibility of error, and therefore cannot be surprised. It also seems that such a creature could not entertain false beliefs, because if it did, then it would be holding such beliefs. Further, Davidson seems to accept the idea of an omniscient interpreter , which suggests that the capacity for surprise is not a necessary condition for belief. Instead perhaps Davidson¡¦s may be reconstructed in a way that avoids this problem.
Moser argues that Davidson¡¦s accommodation of the notion of surprise creates a flaw in his argument . ¡§Surprise¡¨ involves a belief about the falsity of a formerly held belief, and that a believer would not currently hold any ¡§formerly held beliefs¡¨ (which is, by definition, a belief that one does not hold now) . Therefore, the believer would hold any formerly held beliefs and therefore would have no reason to believe that that belief is false. Moser removes the concept of surprise from Davidson¡¦s argument and reconstructs it such that a creature can have the belief that P if it knows the truth-conditions of the belief that P .
However, Ward thinks that Moser¡¦s reconstructed version of the argument commits a circularity in saying that a creature requires knowledge of the truth-conditions of P . Surely knowledge of truth-conditions requires use of a language, and because dumb animals by definition have no language, they cannot have concepts of truth-conditions. Is this really the case? I don¡¦t think so, because, as previously discussed, creatures can have ideas about things in the world and be able to act on those ideas without explicitly forming sentences about the truth of their ideas . Therefore Davidson¡¦s argument for the necessary requirement of surprise is flawed, both because he accepts the concept of an omniscient interpreter and also because the argument (when reconstructed) results in a circular argument.
The requirement of language The most highly-debated requirement Davidson proposes is that ¡§a creature cannot have thoughts unless it is an interpreter of the speech of another¡¨ . This is because animals can¡¦t actually explain the reason for their behaviour without language. However, Armstrong argues that if a dog has beliefs, then what makes his belief a belief is something that pertains to the dog, and has nothing to do with humans and our capacity for speech .
Davidson would probably reply that an interpreter of language is one which can distinguish between the truth and falsity of a concept possessed by another language-speaker. (Of course, this also presupposes that there is another creature in the world that has the capacity for language.) It is not necessary for the interpreter to be able to speak the language; it merely suffices that they know the conditions in which the utterance is true, and therefore can ascertain whether the utterance, as given at a particular instance under particular conditions, is true or false.
So, an interpreter of language must be able to hold a belief true or false. Bishop thinks that this begs the question. Surely creatures without a language cannot hold the concept of a sentence true or false . He further argues that a theory of belief that does not refer to language can still be possible. If this is the case, we need to look at the issue of interpretation. What is it that we are interpreting? We can talk about concepts that we might have without fully understanding them. For example, we may have concepts of colours which we can talk about, but not in an intelligible way. We could respond to Bishop by simply saying that his argument is a version of Graham¡¦s layperson and musicologist analogy, where a layperson and a musicologist who both share the same concept that ¡§X is a better classical pianist than Y¡¨, but in each person the same concept is located in different cognitive space depending on the knowledge that they each have in relation to classical piano music . Similarly, if we had more information about ¡§blue¡¨ (such as what we could learn through physics) then our conceptual networks would be larger, and therefore we would be able to talk about colours more intelligibly. Thus Bishop¡¦s argument needs to be qualified in order for it to stand up to Davidson.
One way of doing strengthening Bishop¡¦s argument is to examine what is required for a conceptual network. Perhaps if we could establish the limits of such a network, we may be able to find a means of refuting Davidson¡¦s stringent requirements for attributing belief.
Chains and networks Davidson argues that in order to have a concept, that concept must be located in cognitive space with reference to other concepts (and therefore we need a language to establish the network between such concepts) . Further, Dennett thinks that it is our ability to manipulate ideas through words which provides us with the capacity to create large networks . Two criticisms of this argument are that humans regularly use concepts without reference to a concept network, and that animals may be capable of simple networks . I will argue for the second criticism.
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Post by KoNeko on Aug 10, 2004 2:52:53 GMT -5
Graham thinks that Davidson¡¦s argument here is that animals do not have belief networks so animals do not have beliefs (but this doesn¡¦t seem to be right- this is only half of Davidson¡¦s requirement for belief as he also argues that beliefs require language and ¡§concept possession¡¨ as well). In any case, Graham objects to the requirement of the belief network. A dog can believe that a cat has run up the tree without reference to the fact that trees live in soil, require water, have leaves, burn, etc. The dog can conceive of the tree from a ¡§stock¡¨ of concepts that it has, and just because we have a different stock of concepts doesn¡¦t mean that we should disregard the concept of ¡§tree¡¨ that the dog may have.
How do we come up with a stock of concepts? I think that we can extend the network of concepts that we have by experience and empirical knowledge. For example, as babies or small children we may have a very limited stock of concepts, but as we grow and become exposed to new things, we can associate the new things that we learn about with old things that we already have concepts of (for example, by their appearance, smell, texture or properties). As such, the new concepts are given a location in our cognitive space and our conceptual network widens. This may be the case with animals as well. In the example of the dog chasing the cat up a tree, even if we did not attribute beliefs to the dog unless we could tell that the dog knew, for example, that trees require water, this means that we also have to attribute concepts of water and those associated concepts (such as hydrogen and oxygen atoms, wetness, dehydration, etc.) to the dog. And so on.
Davidson does not say how complex the conceptual network has to be in order for a creature to have beliefs attributed to it, but it seems absurd to suppose what Davidson meant when he referred to ¡§dense patterns of belief ¡¨ is an infinitely large conceptual network. If this were the case, then many humans would not be capable of belief without the right education, and if we can¡¦t have beliefs, then there is no hope for the attribution of beliefs to animals.
But suppose that instead of entire networks of belief, we look at simpler, unconnected chains of belief. In this case, the dog which barks at the cat in the tree does not have to know about the requirements for growing a tree, whether it has leaves or needles, etc. It suffices that the dog has concepts of the cat, the tree and chasing cats up trees, but he doesn¡¦t need to associate these concepts with the wider ones that we may have when we observe the dog. Perhaps the dog does not identify the oak tree as ¡§the oldest tree¡¨ but instead it identifies it as ¡§the extent of the territory I have marked¡¨. In this case, we do not know what stock of concepts the dog is drawing on, but the idea of the dog¡¦s association of the tree with another concept that it may have (such as territory) is enough to show that the dog¡¦s concept of the tree is not isolated, and therefore it can prima facie have chains of belief, albeit that chains are much more limited than networks.
The concept of chains of beliefs is similar to Hurley¡¦s idea of animals being capable of islands of belief . Both the chains and the islands are isolated from the remainder of the network of beliefs, but they nonetheless can be beliefs that pertain to creatures. Perhaps it is the case that animals with limited capacity for belief, and only over certain simple and unsophisticated things. Armstrong argues that there are two forms of beliefs in the world, one of which could only be given by linguistic expression . The types of belief that fall into this category would be those which are expressed symbolically, such as numbers.
However, Armstrong does not think that it is this simple. Instead, he gives the example of two dogs (let us call them A and B to avoid confusion). Dog A¡¦s master is accustomed to leave the dog for a full day, while Dog B¡¦s master usually leaves the dog for two days. Armstrong thinks that Dog A would appear alert in anticipation of his master returning the next day, while Dog B would not, and would let another day pass before displaying the same expectant behaviour. Therefore, Armstrong argues, Dog B would expect to wait another day before his master returned and as such, the category of concepts that can be expressed linguistically would be more limited that we initially thought.
A response to Armstrong would be that it is quite unlikely that the dogs actually have a concept of ¡§one day¡¨ and ¡§two days¡¨. However, perhaps while dogs do not have the idea of ¡§one¡¨ and ¡§two¡¨ in the same way that we do, they may have basic qualitative concepts, such as their master being out for longer than another dog¡¦s master. As such, if numbers (and other symbols) are purely linguistic beliefs, an animal¡¦s lack of language may hinder their capacity to form these sorts of beliefs, but they may still be capable of having relatively basic ideas in the same vein.
Conclusion From the argument above, we have several reasons for why Davidson¡¦s denial of beliefs to animals should be rejected. Firstly, belief is a concept that we commonly ascribe to animals after observation of certain behaviour which we may find is similar to our own. This simple view of belief may be adequate at a ¡§common sense¡¨ level but Davidson argues that we cannot attribute beliefs to animals because we cannot know what an animal is thinking, as we cannot simply ask it. Armstrong and Bishop argue that even though animals are incapable of language, they nonetheless seem to be able to act intentionally. However, this does not seem to be enough- we need something further to qualify their intention. This can be done by explaining their actions as products of premeditation, which implies that there is at least some sort of belief-like process happening.
Next, if surprise is a necessary requirement of having beliefs, the possibility of an omniscient interpreter presents some difficulty for Davidson¡¦s argument. Moser also identifies that a ¡§formerly held belief¡¨ as something that the animal could not by definition hold now, and reconstructs Davidson¡¦s argument to avoid the requirement of surprise. However, the result seems circular, and as such, Davidson¡¦s concept of surprise fails on both counts.
Finally, the criticism of the anthropocentricity in Davidson¡¦s requirement for language interpretation can be supported by the fact that what we are interpreting is unclear in his argument. Graham¡¦s example of the musicologist indicates that we allocate the same concept in our cognitive space differently depending on our knowledge and experience. Further, Davidson¡¦s denial of conceptual networks to animals seems a bit hasty in the sense we may be able to attribute simple ¡§chains¡¨ of concepts to them. While as humans we are constantly expanding our networks through experience and communication with each other, given that animals do not have the capacity for language, perhaps we may yet be able to grant them simple (non-linguistic) concepts that can associate with other such concepts through chains. If we grant this, we can allow our common sense to attribute beliefs to animals, whist still retaining language as the distinguishing factor in what animals believe, and what we, as humans, do.
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Post by KoNeko on Aug 10, 2004 2:55:26 GMT -5
REFERENCES
Armstrong, D. M., Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge University Press,1973 Bennett, J., Linguistic Behaviour, Cambridge University Press, 1976 Bishop, J., ¡§More Thought on Thought and Talk¡¨, Mind 89 (1980) Caruthers and Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes, Cambridge University Press (1999) Davidson, D., ¡§Rational Animals¡¨, Dialectica 36 (1982) Davidson, D., ¡§The Method of Truth in Metaphysics¡¨, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Claredon Press, 1984 Davidson, D., ¡§Thought and Talk¡¨, in Guttenplan, S. (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford (1975) Dretske, F., ¡§The Intentionality of Cognitive States¡¨, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol V (1980) Fellows, R., ¡§Animal Belief¡¨, Philosophy 75 (2000) Graham, G., Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, Blackwell 1993 Guttenplan, S. (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford (1975) Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Book I Hurley, S., ¡§Animal Action in the Space of Reasons¡¨, Mind and Language 18 No. 3 (2003) Malcolm, N., ¡§Thoughtless Brutes¡¨, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 46 (1972-3) Moser, P. K., ¡§Rationality without surprises: Davidson on Rational Belief¡¨, Dialectica 37, No. 3 (1983) Smith, P., ¡§On Animal Beliefs¡¨, Southern Journal of Philosophy 20 (1982) Sterelny, K., Thought in a Hostile World, Blackwell (2003) Ward, A., ¡§Davidson, Animals and Believings¡¨, Philosophia 19 (1988)
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Post by KoNeko on Nov 6, 2004 21:01:48 GMT -5
This is one of the two essays I wrote for my philosophy of the mind (pathologies) class. Basically we looked at what made a person the same person over time (i.e. the memory requirement) and stuff like that. And I'm attempting to do footnotes!! Actually, I'll make them endnotes because that's easier. The Problem with Q-Memory
The Lockean account of personal identity places the continuity of memory in a central role. However, Butler¡¦s circularity objection has given rise to a new version of the memory criterion, namely Parfit and Shoemaker¡¦s Q-memory. But is Q-memory really a viable version of Locke¡¦s original theory? In some cases, substituting Q-memories for actual memories gives rise to some strange outcomes, one of which is that the context in which an actual memory arises in becomes lost.
In this paper I will examine the content and purpose of Q-memories on Parfit¡¦s account. I will then argue for the "contextual web" required in order for a memory to be intelligible to the experiencer. I will also see how a Parfitian account of Q-memory responds to the objections that I (and others) have raised.
Some background Locke¡¦s theory argues that personal identity is maintained over time by the continuity of memory.1 It is through memory that consciousness reaches back from the present to past stages in the history of an individual. In "Neo-Lockean" terms, the argument is as follows:
I remember doing £X at time t iff:
(1) I am currently in the state of believing that I did £X at t. (2) The content of that state is identical2 to a past experience of doing £X. (3) I did do £X at t.
However, placing memory in such a central place in any theory of personal identity makes it open to several criticisms. Butler argued that Locke¡¦s theory implies that a loss of memory meant a loss of identity, which seems rather strange. More importantly, he also criticised Locke¡¦s theory for its circularity- that is, memory presupposes personal identity, and therefore it could not be a product of that personal identity.
This can be seen from the above. The person stage that did £X and the person stage that remembered doing £X are already presupposed by (3). A person stage is the collection of beliefs, memories and thoughts that a person has at a particular moment, so no two person stages are identical. So, the fact that I actually had the experience at t presupposes that I am the same person now that had the experience at t. This is because the "I" in the above sentences all refer to the same person in the present and past tense. This already presupposes a link between the past and present temporal slices of the person referred to as "I".
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Post by KoNeko on Nov 6, 2004 21:07:26 GMT -5
Further, it has been argued that the "I" in utterances like "I remember doing £X" is immune from error of misidentification.4 The idea behind the immunity from error of misidentification (IEM for short) is that in an utterance about "I" (or me), I cannot be mistaken as to who I am referring to. For example, if I say ¡§John is angry¡¨, I can be mistaken as to what John feels or who is angry.5 Perhaps John is frustrated, but not angry. Alternatively, perhaps it is not John that is angry, but someone else. However, contrast this with the sentence "I am angry. Here, I can be mistaken as to how I feel, so I might be frustrated instead of angry. But I cannot be mistaken as to who is angry. It just doesn¡¦t make any sense for me to be mistaking someone else¡¦s feelings for my own.
The principle of IEM in the above sentences clearly highlights the circularity objection raised by Butler. We cannot be mistaken as to who is having the memory of doing £X at time t so there is no room for reinterpreting the Lockean claim to avoid the circularity. The main criticism lies in using I in (3), since that is how the circularity arises, so next we will examine a way around (3).
Q-memory ¡V its functions and purposes In order to produce an account of memory that does not presuppose personal identity, Shoemaker and Parfit propose the idea of Q(uasi)-memory:6
I Q-remember doing £X at time t iff:
(1) I am currently in the state of believing that I did £X at t. (2) The content of that state is identical to a past experience of doing £X (3) There was someone who did £X at t (and nobody else did £X).
This removes the circularity as the requirements do not presuppose personal identity, because the "I" here only refers to a present-tense identification and as such there is no presupposed link between present and past "person-slices". One of the roles of Q-memory on the Parfitian account is for Q-memory to adequately get around Butler¡¦s circularity objection.7 Parfit also claims that, in a revised psychological criterion of personal identity, we can still have continuity over time if there is a ¡§strong connectedness¡¨ between Q-memories on a daily basis.8 What follows is that when I seem to remember an experience, I am merely assuming that I am identical with the person who had the experience.9 So it seems that, on Parfit¡¦s view, Q-memory has the primary purpose of overcoming the circularity objection that Butler raises.
But the practical function of a Q-memory is different from that of an actual memory. The Q-memory performs the role of being an "information state" to facilitate the link between a past experience and the present recollection of that experience.10 It no longer has the self-reference that makes it immune from error of misidentification that an actual memory has. As such, if I Q-remember doing £X, then I merely assume that it was me doing £X, but it could have been someone else. So all a Q-memory really tells me is that there was someone (that might or might not have been me11) that did £X at some earlier time.
Another point about Q-memory is that it also seems to meet the memory requirement sufficiently in most normal circumstances. However, in abnormal (or extreme) circumstances, Q-memory gives rise to some bizarre outcomes. The most obvious is that the analysis of memory has been so weakened that memory (or rather, Q-memory) does not guarantee personal identity; indeed, we can imagine an example where person b Q-remembers person a¡¦s experiences and so on.12 But I will not discuss this here because there is already extensive literature on this particular problem. Instead, I will look at another related, but just as strange outcome which arises as a result of Q-memory.
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Post by KoNeko on Nov 6, 2004 21:09:41 GMT -5
So there are two claims being made here. One is the strong claim that Q-memory is generally incoherent, because there is no guarantee of personal identity. The weaker version (which I will now follow) is that Q-memory is adequate in ordinary circumstances, but there are certain cases in which it results in incoherent results.
The context dependency of memory As Q-memories do not guarantee personal identity, we come to the abnormal cases where one¡¦s memories can be transplanted into another person. If this is the case, Slors claims that Parfit¡¦s examples are overly simplistic and the idea of Q-memories is unintelligible.13 He gives the example of the memory of walking your children to school. Suppose that the memory of walking a familiar route with your children to school, your children, is somehow surgically implanted in my brain. What would my Q-memories of your experiences be like? Slors argues that they would be pretty bizarre. I have never seen your children before and I do not know your neighbourhood. Thus your memory of walking a particular route would not evoke any sense of familiarity in me, and in my eyes the children would be strangers. The Q-memory that I have alone would not bring with it the beliefs that this is the route to school, the desire for your children to get a good education, etc. that you would have had at the time of the experience. So my Q-memory of walking your children to school would be substantially different from your experience of it. And this would conflict with conditions (1) and (2) in the definition of Q-memory.
Further, even if the set of beliefs, desires etc. that you had at the time were implanted into my head along with the Q-memory (so I now had the belief that this was the route to school, and I wanted the children I now believe to be mine to have a good education etc.), that set might still conflict with the wider and more inclusive set of beliefs, desires, etc. that I have about my ordinary life, such as the belief that I don¡¦t have children, and that when I went to school I did not go by this particular route, etc. So my experience of the Q-memory, coupled with your accompanying beliefs and desires would still be strange, and I would probably think that they were delusions.
So, unless you were to wipe my brain clean and insert the complete set of your memories, beliefs, desires and other mental states into my brain (or alternatively, a brain transplant will do), there is no coherent means for me to Q-remember having the experience that you had when you walked your children to school that day. Memories, and other mental states, are not isolated in conceptual space14 and as such severing such a link would result in a loss of the context that a particular mental state relates to. So the Q-memory of walking your children to school is severed from its contextual web of other mental states, such as the knowledge of your relationship with your children, earlier memories you have of having walked this way to school, your hopes that your children like school, etc.. And without such a contextual web accompanying the Q-memory, the full effect of the experience is lost on me. So a Q-memory out of context would not have the same impact that an ordinary memory does on an experiencer.
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